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A Proposal for Protecting Privacy
During the Information
Age*
This note argues that current law does little to protect individual
and business privacy from the significant threats posed by
computer technology. While conventional criminal statutes can be
used against certain misues of computer resources, most do not
address the difficulties of safeguarding computerized data. Those
statutes aimed at computer crime either are incomplete or do not
target Alaskan computer resources. This note proposes an
Alaskan statute carefully drafted to avoid the loopholes in most
existing statutes. The statute contains both criminal provisions,
graded to the severity of the misconduct, and civil provisions,
containing a unique standard of care for system operators.
A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature
is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every
other. A solemn consideration, when I enter a great city by
night, that every one of those darkly clustered houses encloses
its own secret; that every room in every one of them encloses its
own secret; that every beating heart in the hundreds of thou-
sands of breasts there is, in some of its imaginings, a secret to
the heart nearest it! - Dickens
I. INTRODUCTION
According to a 1990 Harris survey, seventy-nine percent of
Americans are "concerned about threats to their personal priva-
cy."'2  Nearly seventy-five percent believe "they have 'lost all
control over how personal information about them is circulated and
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1. Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities 21 (Signet Classic ed., New
American Library 1980) (1859).
2. Craig M. Cornish & Donald B. Louria, Employment Drug Testing,
Preventative Searches, and the Future of Privacy, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95,114
(1991).
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used by companies."' 3  The pervasiveness of computers and
computerized data collection undoubtedly forms the basis for at
least part of these fears. Many tasks in modem society, from the
making of hotel reservations and the collection of income taxes to
the design of products, have been made more efficient and more
profitable by the application of computer technology.4 Computer-
ized efficiency does not come without a price, however, and that
price is a loss of privacy.5
Computers pose a unique threat to individual privacy because
they render vast amounts of personal data instantly accessible to
strangers. Once information enters a computer databank, the
person who provided it, and often those who collect, store and use
it, lose control of the information.6 The information then becomes
prey to viruses,7 hackers8 and even legitimate businessmen.'
3. Id. (quoting Privacy: Survey Finds Public Concern Rising Over Protection
of Personal Privacy, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTivEs, June 12, 1990, at A8).
4. See David C. Tunick, Computer Law: An Overview, 13 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
315 (1980).
5. For example, many businesses keep computer databases on clients that
include such information as age, income and spending patterns. The information
is often sold, without the customer's knowledge, to direct mail advertisers. Id. at
335. While such activities may appear innocuous, the concentration of personal
information means businesses can decide whether to do business with individuals
based on attitudes, tastes, interests, politics, etc., thus facilitating a sort of
computerized discrimination. Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and
the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEx. L. REV. 1395,
1404 (1987).
6. Graham, supra note 5, at 1399. "Databanking," the storage of files in a
computer, is the computer technology most often identified with threats to privacy.
"Datashadow," or the trail an individual leaves behind through a series of
computer-recorded transactions, is a related danger. Because it is more expensive
to delete information than to leave it in the database, outdated personal
information may remain on file for years. Id. at 1400. For example, a recent
study concluded that only 12% of criminal history records transmitted from a
North Carolina database to other law enforcement agencies were correct. Spiros
Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 719
(1987).
7. "Virus" is a generic term for hidden computer instructions which are
potentially harmful, sometimes altering data files or copying them into other
databanks. Viruses replicate many times during a single execution of a legitimate
program. They are passed on quickly through modems, disks and networks. In
1988, 60,000 computers were infected and 6200 halted by a virus unleashed on an
academic network by a graduate student. Anne W. Branscomb, Rogue Computer
Programs and Computer Rogues: Tailoring the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TEciI. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1990). Although the virus did not
damage any computer data, the event exposed the vulnerability of networks and
computers to outside tampering. Id.
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Although privacy invasion often comes in small doses, its effects
can be substantial. For example, since most computer matching
programs0 use social security numbers to make matches between
data files," an industrious business could collect customers' social
security numbers, comb the numerous national matching programs
and compile detailed profiles of each customer. 2 Thus, through
the application of computers, the incremental erosion of privacy
quickly can turn into a wholesale loss.
13
Alaska is not immune from the threats to privacy posed by
computers. For example, in 1977 a major oil company intentionally
intercepted the computerized transmission and processing of a
competitor's data on bids for drilling rights in Alaska. The oil
company then used the intercepted information to underbid the
8. "Hackers," outsiders who have experience in bypassing computer security
systems, may break into computer systems to steal information or merely to
challenge themselves.
9. More dangerous than the computer hacker is the unscrupulous legitimate
user who already possesses knowledge about the operation of the computer
system. Cheryl S. Massingale & A. Faye Borthick, Risk Allocation for Computer
System Security Breaches: Potential Liability for Providers of Computer Services,
12 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 167, 171-72 (1990). The American Bar Association
estimates that over 77% of computer crimes are committed by insiders. A.B.A.
Task Force on Computer Crime, Report on Computer Crime, 1984 A.B.A. SEC. OF
CRIM. JUSTICE 19.
10. "Computer matching" involves matching information from massive
numbers of computerized personal files to conduct investigations. John Shattuck,
In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, &
Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1001 (1984).
11. Simitis, supra note 6, at 715.
12. See Graham, supra note 5, at 1396.
13. See Cornish & Louria, supra note 2, at 115. Networks are another
computer technology that threatens privacy. Networks link computer terminals,
making a service performed by a computer at one place available to a computer
user at another place. Branscomb, supra note 7, at 1 n.1. Common network
functions include inter-departmental electronic mail ("E-mail") and funds-transfer
networks such as those connecting automatic teller machines. Networks threaten
privacy because they often are not secure and because they are a powerful
investigatory tool when coupled with databanks.
Networks often are paired with databanks for computer matching investiga-
tions. For example, when a government agency does a criminal investigation of
an individual, computer networks are used to collect information on the
individual's activities and prior convictions. The agency searches databases by
entering, for example, the individual's social security number in the network.
When a match is made, the individual's file is sent through the network from its
database. Eventually, the agency can create a complete portrait of the individual
based on files in several databases. Thus, a network may carry significant amounts
of sensitive information.
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competitor. 4 In order to discourage such behavior, Alaska needs
a comprehensive statute protecting computer privacy.
Regulating computer use, however, involves a delicate compro-
mise. Placing electronic "locks" on data makes computer use more
cumbersome and impedes efficient information management.
Further, information plays an important role in a modem, demo-
cratic society. One commentator identifies information as "the
currency of the 'marketplace of ideas,' the prerequisite for political
self-determination."15 If society is overzealous in restricting the
free flow of information, the so-called "right to be let alone" turns
into an impediment to democratic decision-making.
Privacy is also important to a modem, democratic society,
however. Just as "the marketplace of ideas" contributes to
democracy, privacy contributes to autonomy, and ensures that
individuals need not have every choice exposed by the popular
will. 6 Finally, if information is the currency of the "marketplace
of ideas," privacy provides value to that currency by making the
individual the titleholder of a form of personal property.17 Only
by giving the individual the power to grant or refuse access to
personal information can he profit from what logically belongs to
him.
Alaska law presently does not strike the delicate balance
between privacy and the free flow of information; rather, it leaves
private information subject to exploitation by third parties. 8 This
note proposes a statute aimed at addressing the issue of privacy in
the information age. Part II considers privacy protection under
current Alaska law. Part III analyzes computer privacy statutes
enacted by both the federal government and other Ninth Circuit
states. Finally, part IV offers a new computer privacy statute to
14. Thomas Whiteside, Annals of Crime: Dead Souls in the Computer, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 22, 1977, at 57-58.
15. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets & Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1991).
16. Graham, supra note 5, at 1406.
17. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 963, 977 (1964).
18. Additionally, the law is insufficient in its protection of more conventional
property interests, and any Alaskan computer legislation should protect against the
threats computers pose to property as well as privacy. For example, the clever
bank employee can slowly divert funds from a number of accounts into his own
account with little fear of detection. Loss estimates for insider crime range up to
five billion dollars per year. Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High
Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898, 1900 (1991).
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deal with the current deficiencies in Alaska law and to promote the
tradition of strong individualism in Alaska."
II. PRIVACY PROTECTION UNDER ALASKA LAW
Alaska's laws offer little protection for electronically stored
data, and few cases have addressed the special privacy implications
of widespread computer use. The Alaska Supreme Court, however,
has recognized the right to privacy from both state and private
intrusions in other contexts. °  Thus, a general public policy
supporting privacy in Alaska can be inferred. It is this policy which
provides the theoretical foundation for an Alaskan computer
privacy statute.
A. Criminal Penalties
1. General Criminal Statutes. The Alaska criminal statutes
do not cover most misuses of computer resources. For example,
Alaska's general theft statute defines "theft" as obtaining the
property of another "with intent to deprive another of [it] or to
appropriate [it] to oneself or a third person."2' As the legislature
has defined "property" to include "data or information stored in a
computer program, system, or network,"' the statute would seem
to apply to computer resources and information. The Alaska
Supreme Court has ruled that "theft" requires interference with
one's possession of property, however z Unlike with other types
of property, when information is misappropriated the "owner"
retains possession of the information because, in essence, only a
copy of the information has been stolen.24
19. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) ("[S]tate has
traditionally been the home of people who prize their individuality and who have
chosen to settle or continue living here in order to achieve a measure of control
over their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our sister
states.").
20. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed."); Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 62
(Alaska 1987) ("The right to be free from harassment and constant intrusion into
one's daily affairs is enjoyed by all persons." (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 807-09 (4th ed. 1971))).
21. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.100(1) (1989).
22. Id. § 11.81.900(b)(46) (Supp. 1993).
23. See Howard v. State, 583 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1978)(intent to deprive owner
of property necessary element of crime); Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska
1970) (possession is the gravamen of larceny offense).
24. See Branscomb, supra note 7, at 32; Brenda Nelson, Note, Straining the
Capacity of the Common Law: The Idea of Computer Crime in the Age of the
Computer Worm, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 299 (1991).
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Another Alaska statute provides limited protection against
computer misuse. The offense of "theft of services" includes
unauthorized use of computer time, systems, networks and pro-
grams.25 While this statute prohibits unauthorized access, it does
not protect against additional improper activities. A hacker who
misappropriates a corporation's mailing list for illegitimate purposes
would be guilty only of no greater crime than an employee who
allowed his child to write a term paper on an office terminal. The
current statute simply does not reach all of the potentially danger-
ous results of unauthorized access and theft of services. The misuse
that current legislation does cover may be of the type more
appropriately handled by internal corporate security.
2. Alaska Computer Statutes. The Alaska legislature has
defined two criminal offenses specifically prohibiting the misuse of
computers. The misdemeanor of criminal mischief in the third
degree occurs when an unauthorized person "knowingly accesses a
computer, computer system, computer program, computer network,
or part of a computer system or network. 26 The statute is a good
first step, for it recognizes computer abuse as behavior worth
prohibiting but does not overestimate the threat posed by computer
"spying" that makes no use of stored information.
The second offense, criminal use of a computer, occurs when
an unauthorized person knowingly accesses a computer system and
"(1) obtains information concerning a person; or (2) introduces
false information... with the intent to damage or enhance the data
record of a person."' 7 Criminal use of a computer is a class C
felony." The criminal use statute is more interesting for what it
does not cover, however, than for what it does. The statute
addresses only unauthorized users; authorized users, such as
employees of a database owner, could obtain data on an individual,
organization or company and then put it to unauthorized uses.
The criminal use statute also may prohibit only the removal of
personal data from a computer system, not its copying or misuse.
In offenses against property, Alaska defines "obtain" as "to bring
about a transfer or a purported transfer of a legal interest in the
property ... or to -exert control over property of another."29 As
long as personal information remains stored in its original form in
25. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200(a)(3) (1989).
26. ALASKA STAT. § 11A6.484(a)(5) (1989). "'[Access' means to instruct,
communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise obtain the ability
to use the resources of a computer.... ." Id. § 11.46.990(1).
27. Id. § 11.46.740.
28. Id.
29. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.990(11)(A) (1989).
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the computer system, an unauthorized user may be able to access
and use the data without violating the statute. The prohibition
against criminal use of a computer appears to ban only limited
activities and provides insufficient protection against privacy
threats. 0
B. Civil Remedies.
In Darling v. Standard Alaska Production Co.,3 the Alaska
Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court's ruling
that trade secret laws protect privacy rights." Thus, trade secret
law may safeguard certain types of data stored on computers. For
information to be considered a trade secret, the Alaska Uniform
Trade Secrets Act requires that the information (1) derive indepen-
dent economic value from not being generally known to the public
and (2) be the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.33
Organizations easily could meet the second prong of the test by
scrupulouslr protecting the information stored on computer from
disclosure.
The first prong of the test is the more difficult one to satisfy.
In order to derive its value from secrecy, the information must not
be "readily ascertainable by proper means by [] other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use., 35 Designs
30. One Alaska computer network which has received significant legislative
attention is the criminal justice information system. There are specific limits on
the use and right of access to the system, and regulations to ensure the security
and privacy of the information stored on the system are authorized. See ALASKA
STAT. § 12.62.010 (1989). The court of appeals recently held that prosecutors may
use the network to run background checks on potential jurors, however. Tagala
v. State, 812 P.2d 604 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
31. 818 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1991).
32. Id. at 681 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487
(1974)).
33. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.940(3) (Supp. 1993).
34. In Darling, the Alaska Supreme Court denied trade secret protection to a
designer of a linked concrete block system. 818 P.2d at 683. In State Department
of Natural Resources v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., however, the court held that
data on oil well conditions was a trade secret. 834 P.2d 134, 138 (Alaska 1991).
The distinction between the two rulings lies in the extent of the plaintiffs' efforts
to protect the information. The plaintiff in Darling took no steps to ensure the
secrecy of his invention as required by the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Instead,
he presented a seminar on his product before obtaining a patent, and later sought
to recover under a theory of unjust enrichment. 818 P.2d at 678-79. The plaintiffs
in Arctic Slope, on the other hand, sought an injunction to bar initial disclosure of
their information. 834 P.2d at 136.
35. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.940(3)(A) (Supp. 1993).
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or formulas fit the secrecy requirement,36 but personal information
contained on customer databanks might not. While a person might
be entitled to withhold his address, for example, a competitor easily
could discover it from legitimate sources other than the database.
Thus, the information would be "readily ascertainable" and not
subject to trade secret protection. Furthermore, some personal
information stored on databases might not be of any economic
value, and that too would disqualify it from protection under trade
secret law.
C. The Basis for a New Statute
Additional legislation is needed to protect against threats to
individual privacy posed by computers in Alaska. As a basis for a
new computer privacy statute, the legislature can look to both the
Alaska Constitution and the common law for a general public
policy favoring privacy in Alaska. For example, in Article I,
section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, the State grants its citizens
an express right to privacy.37 Such privacy protection is broader
than that offered by the federal Constitution.38
Nevertheless, the right of privacy granted by the Alaska
Constitution only protects privacy interests against state action, and
thus must by supplemented with a prohibition of private intrusions
of privacy. The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized a common
law right to privacy. 9 Furthermore, the court has derived a
general public policy favoring privacy from the common law and
the constitutional provision. In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling
Inc.,' the court used this policy to create a privacy right in the
employment context. The court asserted that:
[T]he citizens' right to be protected against unwarranted
intrusions into their private lives has been recognized in the law
of Alaska. The constitution protects against governmental
intrusion... and the common law protects against intrusions by
other private persons. As a result, there is sufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that there exists a public policy protecting
36. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001-02 (1984).
37. The Alaska Constitution provides: "The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this
section." ALAsKA CONST. art. I, §22.
38. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 878-79 (Alaska 1978).
39. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123,1133 (Alaska 1989)
("[Tihere exists a common law right to privacy."). This right is based upon the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, which provides that "[o]ne who intention-
ally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or
his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."
40. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
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spheres of employment conduct into which employers may not
intrude.4
This same public policy provides the theoretical foundation for a
new computer privacy statute. By enacting such a law, the Alaska
legislature would be acting pursuant to a tradition supporting
individual privacy in the state.
HI. THE FEDERAL AND NINTH CIRCUIT COMPUTER PRIVACY
MODELS
Both the federal government and the states of the Ninth
Circuit have been quite responsive to the computer threat to
privacy. Their statutes may provide a model for an Alaskan
statute. Not all of the statutes have been successful, however, and
Alaska should be careful not to duplicate the mistakes. Most
importantly, none of the statutes provides adequate protection
against the threat of insider crime. Alaska has an opportunity to
be among the vanguard of computer crime legislation by enacting
a standard of care for system operators.
A. Federal Computer Privacy Statutes
The federal government protects computer privacy through
four pieces of legislation: the wire fraud statute, the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act,43 the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act' and the Computer Security Act.45 The federal legislation
covers only threats to national interests, however, and thus does
not provide sufficiently comprehensive protection for Alaskan
computer privacy concerns. While the Alaska legislature should be
careful not to duplicate federal law needlessly, certain interests
addressed by the federal legislation should be incorporated into an
Alaskan computer privacy statute.
1. The Federal Wire Fraud Statute. The federal wire fraud
statute addresses any person who uses wire communications to
perpetrate a scheme to defraud.' Courts have construed the
legislation to include computer offenses, so long as the fraud is
perpetrated either over interstate lines or lines involved in foreign
commerce.47 Prosecutors have used the statute to convict persons
41. Id. at 1133.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. IV 1993).
43. Id. § 1030 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
44. Id. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
45. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. IV 1993).
47. Jerome Y. Roach6, Computer Crime Deterrence, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391,
393-94 (1986).
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who deleted and added information to individuals' computerized
credit files," airline employees who kept the proceeds from
falsified computerized ticket sales49 and an ex-employee who
retrieved information from his former employer's computer sys-
tem." Because of the simplicity of the statute, fraud easily could
be found in cases of theft of computer time, valuable information
or financial information. The legislation also is sufficiently flexible
to reach situations involving destruction of computer resources.
The simplicity of the wiretap statute also results in limitations,
however. The statute focuses on fraud instead of privacy, and thus
fails to criminalize "snooping." The lack of focus on privacy
concerns also means the statute does not make vital distinctions
between actions such as the theft of a valuable corporate mailing
list and an employee's use of the company computer to do personal
work. It also fails to address improper dissemination of computer-
ized information by insiders. Moreover, the statute only covers
communications on wires used in interstate commerce.5 ' Thus, the
federal wire fraud statute provides a good beginning for state
legislation protecting computer privacy interests, but does not cover
many of the activities that should be included in an Alaskan
statute.
2. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 ("CFAA"), 2 part of the Crime
Control Act, was the first federal statute to address computer
crime. 3 Because it applies only to computer crime affecting a
federal interest, most threats to computer privacy are not affected
by the CFAA 4 Still, the CFAA provides some guidance for a
48. United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
49. United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1980).
50. United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978).
51. Data storage or other computer functions that do not involve electronic
transmissions affecting interstate or foreign commerce are not within Congress'
powers. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986).
53. Dodd S. Griffith, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REv. 453,455 (1990); Roachd, supra
note 47, at 397.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. In light of several policy considerations, Congress
decided to limit the scope of federal computer crime legislation. Griffith, supra
note 53, at 484. Congress wanted state and local legislators to handle most
offenses of that nature. Id. Congress also found that most computer crime was
committed by insiders and not the well-publicized teenage hacker. Id. at 486. But,
in the 1986 amendment to the CFAA, Congress precluded liability in purely
insider cases. (The Senate Judiciary Committee defined "purely insider cases" as
those involving unauthorized access to intra-department, as opposed to in-
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proposed Alaskan computer privacy statute.
First, the CFAA differentiates between types of undesirable
activity and the penalties appropriate for each. For example, the
CFAA distinguishes between simple trespass"5 and trespass with
the intent to defraud. 6 One who accesses a computer without
authorization but with no intent to use stored information should
not be punished as severely as one who does with an intent to de-
fraud.
Second, Congress made clear that information did not have to
be removed from a databank in order for a crime to occur. The
legislative history of the CFAA explains that "obtaining" financial
information does not require gaining physical possession of it, as
theft statutes do, but includes mere observation (i.e., "snooping.")
as well 8 Thus, the statute avoids the difficulties that would be
encountered by an Alaska prosecutor attempting to apply Alaska's
theft statute to a perpetrator who copied, but did not remove,
information from a computerized database.
Third, the CFAA takes into account the unique nature of
computer technology, as Congress carefully crafted the statutory
language to ensure that only malicious computer operators would
be prosecuted. The 1986 amendments changed the mens rea from
"knowingly" to "intentionally" for computer fraud that results in
obtaining financial information. "Knowledge" is often an inappro-
priate mens rea standard for crimes involving computers because it
requires that a result be practically certain, but does not require the
desire to achieve that result.5 9 A computer operator might
stumble inadvertently upon financial data by accidentally entering
a data retrieval command. Once the appropriate command is
entered erroneously, the retrieval of data is a virtual certainty
despite the operator's lack of desire to retrieve the data. Thus, a
ter-department, resources. S. REP. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2485. This alleviated concerns that the statute could
be used against whistleblowers. Id.) In passing the 1986 amendment, Congress
reaffirmed its initial skepticism about the need for a broad federal law: "The
[Senate Judiciary] Committee ... prefers ... to limit Federal jurisdiction over
computer crime to those cases in which there is a compelling Federal interest, i.e.,
where computers of the Federal Government or certain financial institutions are
involved, or where the crime itself is interstate in nature." S. REP. No. 432, at
2482; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) (1988) (defining a "federal interest
computer").
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (1988).
56. Id. § 1030(a)(4) (1988).
57. S. REP. No. 432 at 2487.
58. Id. at 2484.
59. Id.
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careless but innocent computer operator could be penalized under
a "knowledge" standard.
The CFAA is not without its weaknesses, however. For
example, it provides no civil remedies,' and protects only a
narrow range of computers and information. An Alaskan statute
should include a civil remedies provision for a broad range of
offenses while incorporating the strengths of the federal statute.
3. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act. As the name
suggests, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") 61
safeguards the privacy of communications made by electronic
means. The ECPA protects electronically transmitted data in a
manner similar to the federal wire fraud statute.62 Many comput-
er operations involving transmission of data, such as networking
and electronic mail, are especially sensitive to privacy threats.
Under the ECPA, computer hackers may neither intentionally
intercept electronic communications63 nor access stored communi-
cations.' The ECPA also provides some protection for databases,
since they can be characterized as communications in storage at
remote locations.65
The ECPA is not without its limitations, however. Many
crucial terms such as "computer" and "access" are left unde-
fined.' Additionally, like the CFAA, the ECPA does not contain
a civil remedies provision. Finally, the ECPA is concerned only
with eavesdropping on electronic communications.67 Destructive
activities such as releasing viruses or unauthorized use of computer
resources are not prohibited by this act. An Alaskan statute should
close the gaps in the ECPA to provide better privacy protection as
well as improved safeguarding of computer resources.
60. Cf Darryl C. Wilson, Viewing Computer Crime: Where Does the Systems
Error Really Exist?, 11 CoMPUrER/L.J. 265, 276 (1991) ("The most troubling
aspect [of Illinois' computer statute] is the complete removal of the civil remedies
section.").
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1988).
62. Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., Communications Privacy: A Legislative
Perspective, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 715, 727.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1988).
64. Id. § 2701.
65. Kastenmeier et al., supra note 62, at 728.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1988) (defining terms used in the ECPA).
67. The ECPA defines "intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the
contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication.... ." Id. § 2510(4) (Supp.
1993).
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4. The Computer Security Act. Congress passed the Comput-
er Security Act ("CSA") 8 to "improv[e] the security and privacy
of sensitive information in Federal computer systems. 6  This
statement of purpose illustrates both the breadth and the limita-
tions of the statute, as it expresses broad concern with computer
privacy but limits its reach to sensitive information stored on
federal computers.' Further, the protection afforded to "sensitive
information" only extends to data that could adversely affect the
national interest or that is protected by the Privacy Act.7' Most
computer-stored information does not meet such specifications.
The federal government's concern with privacy is admirable
and should be considered when developing an Alaskan computer
privacy statute. Alaska, however, should extend protection much
further than the CSA. State legislation should protect more types
of computer systems and information, as well as provide a private
cause of action.72
5. Lessons from Federal Legislation. The CFAA provides
the most useful aspects for an Alaska criminal computer use statute
to adopt. Its differentiation between types of culpable conduct and
threatened interests is crucial to effective and fair legislation
regarding improper computer activities. Congress carefully defined
the mens rea and actus reus elements of the crime to fit the special
difficulties posed by computer technology. The result is a statute
that is a good first step toward combatting computer abuses.
Overall, the federal statutes are effective in limited areas, but
they were not passed as a cohesive effort to fight computer crime.
The result is a piecemeal treatment of the threat to computer
resources and personal privacy. None of the statutes provides a
standard of care for computer operators, thus leaving insiders the
freedom to act negligently in the management of private informa-
68. 40 U.S.C. § 759 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
69. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 2(a), 101 Stat. 1724
(1988).
70. State and local governments, private individuals and corporations own
many more computers than does the federal government. Compare S. REP. No.
432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2479
(reporting that by 1990, the Federal Government was expected to be using 250,000
to 500,000 computers) with FINAL REPORT: SMALL BusnqEss COMPUTER
SECURiTY EDUCATION AND ADVISORY COUNCIL, published in 7 COMPUTER L.
REP. 525 (1988) (reporting that by 1987, 11 million small businesses used
computers).
71. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 20(d)(4), 101 Stat.
1727 (1988).
72. See Wilson, supra note 60, at 276.
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tion stored in computers. Additionally, the statutes are limited to
federal interests, leaving interests unique to Alaskan citizens
unprotected. A cohesive and comprehensive statute would better
serve the broad privacy interests recognized under Alaska law.73
B. Computer Privacy Statutes of Ninth Circuit States
Other states in the Ninth Circuit have passed laws dealing with
the problem of computer crime. Comprehensive state statutes such
as California's could serve as the model for Alaska's new legisla-
tion, while others should serve as examples of potential pitfalls.
1. California. Motivated by a desire to expand the protec-
tion afforded by previous computer tampering legislation,74 the
California legislature passed one of the most comprehensive
computer crime laws in the nation.' Appropriately, the statute
begins with the declaration that "protection of the integrity of all
types and forms of lawfully created ... computer systems ... is
vital to the protection of the privacy of individuals., 76 Prohibited
activities under the California statute include introducing a virus, 77
trafficking in passwords,78 using computer time without authoriza-
tion79 and making use of stored data without permission.0 Such
specificity ensures that no criminal will find refuge in loopholes
contained in more generally drafted statutes. Attempting to deal
with all computer crime through a general computer fraud statute,
as some states have done,8' is analogous to attempting to include
armed robbery, burglary, pick-pocketing, and shoplifting in a single,
general theft statute. Although the crimes have much in common,
their differences require distinct treatment.
The California statute also contains a provision regarding
forfeiture of computer equipment 82 as well as one prohibiting the
73. See part II.C. for a discussion of the Alaska public policy favoring broad
privacy rights.
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(a) (West 1988).
75. Camille Cardoni Marion, Note, Computer Viruses and the Law, 93 DICK.
L. REV. 625, 632 (1989).
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(a) (West 1988).
77. Id. § 502(c)(8) (West Supp. 1994). See supra note 7 for a detailed
explanation of a "virus."
78. Id. § 502(c)(6) (West 1988).
79. Id. § 502(c)(3).
80. Id. § 502(c)(2).
81. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2316(A) (1989) (defining "computer
fraud" as "accessing, altering, damaging or destroying without authorization any
computer, computer system, [or] computer network....").
82. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(g) (West Supp. 1994). See also id. § 502.01(a)(1)
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use of computers after conviction.' Such provisions are essential
to the statute's effectiveness because they serve as an obstacle to
those who might attempt to repeat their criminal conduct. Also,
such statutes match the punishment with the crime by depriving the
criminal of the instrumentality of his offense, much like existing
statutes prohibit convicted felons from owning a gun. Finally, the
California statute contains a civil remedies provision' and covers
situations where the perpetrator was in another jurisdiction when
he accessed California computersY While some of the provisions
may be unnecessary or duplicative of federal efforts, the California
statute is comprehensive in its protection of computer privacy and
resources.
Still, there is room for improvement. Despite its emphasis on
privacy, the California statute seems crafted to protect the interests
of business, rather than those of the individual. For example, the
statute pays too little attention to the threats that insiders pose to
individual privacy. Employees whose access or use of computer
systems exceeds the scope of their authority cannot be prosecuted
unless their activities damage the system or they use more than
$100 worth of computer services.8 6 Such a threshold of protection
might be adequate to protect commercial interests, which can easily
be measured by a dollar value and are unlikely to be significant
below the $100 mark; however, the standard fails to protect
individuals against those who might invade and misuse personal
data records without causing any damage to the system. Such an
emphasis on businesses' privacy is repeated throughout the statute.
The California statute lacks both a standard of care for system
operators (to accompany the provision for civil remedies) and
specific protection for whistleblowing. A standard of care would
require system operators to forgo installing sub-standard security
devices as a means of cutting costs.
2. Other Ninth Circuit States. Computer crime statutes of
other Ninth Circuit states are not as comprehensive as California's.
Most of these other states define two types of computer crime:
schemes to defraud through use of a computer, which is usually a
(defines property subject to forfeiture); id. § 502.01(e) (property subject to
forfeiture includes parental property of a minor convicted of computer crime).
83. Id. § 1203.047 (employment connected with computer is forbidden while
on probation for violation of § 502 or § 502.7); id. § 2702 (no access to prison
computer if convicted of computer crime).
84. Id. § 502(e) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
85. Id. § 5020) (West 1994).
86. Id. § 502(h)(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
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felony,87 and unauthorized use of computer resources, which is
usually a misdemeanor.' Such statutes suffer from the limitations
of general statutes discussed above.89 For example, in Washing-
ton, a police officer who obtained pictures and biographies of
female University of Washington students for his personal use
avoided conviction under the state's computer trespass statute
because it prohibited only unauthorized access to, not unauthorized
use of, computerized information.' The defendant was authorized
to use the state licensing bureau computers which stored the
students' personal information because he was a police officer.
Because the police officer's actions were neither an unauthorized
use nor a scheme to defraud, he would have escaped punishment
under most other states' computer privacy statutes as well.91
Nevada has made an attempt to provide greater protection to
the interests threatened by computer technology. Nevada's
computer crime statute contains a unique provision under which
district attorneys can seek an injunction to prevent the occurrence
of computer crimes without demonstrating proof of actual damage
and without precluding prosecution. 2 Some scholars have argued
that expedited methods of investigation and prevention are
necessary because computer functions and computer crimes can
occur in a split-second. 9
Like California, however, Nevada neglects the threat of insider
computer crime. The Nevada statute presumes an employee has
the authority to access and use any computer system or stored data
owned or operated by his employer.94 Again, such lack of concern
for the threat "authorized" users pose leaves the individual with
insufficient privacy protection. Most individuals agree to provide
personal information to companies and governments because the
benefits gained through social security numbers, censuses, etc., are
worth the price of diminished privacy. The cornerstone of that
agreement, however, is the individual's assumption that the
information will not be used for purposes other than those for
87. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-2202(1) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-311(1)-
(c) (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377(2)(a) (1990).
88. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-2202(3) (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-311(1)-
(a) (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377(4) (1990).
89. Supra text accompanying note 81.
90. State v. Olson, 735 P.2d 1362, 1364 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
91. Alaska's current criminal use of a computer statute does not prohibit such
activities either. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
92. NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.491 (1992).
93. Diana Wilkes, The Wiretap Statute: A Haven for Hackers, 31 JURIMETRICS
J. 415, 418 (1991).
94. NEv. REV. STAT. § 205.485 (1992).
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which it was collected.' Unscrupulous businesses might not
adhere to such an implicit agreement, and courts faced with such
conflicts often find that the individual's initial consent to the
collection of personal information justifies its further use.96 An
Alaskan statute should remedy these abuses by limiting the use of
personal information to those specifically condoned by the subject
of such information.
3. Lessons from Ninth Circuit States' Legislation. State
legislation is important in the area of computer abuse. It ensures
that local, as well as federal, interests are addressed. An effective
state statute should cover a variety of computer abuses and tailor
its language to fit the unique characteristics of computer technolo-
gy. The California statute provides the best model for a state
criminal computer use statute. Its comprehensiveness and attention
to the types of improper conduct bring a wide variety of computer
abuses within its scope. The result is an excellent model for how
computer abuses should be targeted in Alaska.
All of the state statutes, however, suffer from an insufficient
emphasis on the privacy of the individual. Like the federal
statutes, none of the state legislation provides a standard of care for
computer operators. Moreover, none ensures that the use of
personal information is limited to the specific purposes for which
it was collected. The Alaskan statute should incorporate provisions
protecting against insider crime in order to provide its citizens with
the best protection of privacy rights available.
IV. TIE PROPOSAL TO PROTECt COMPUTER PRIVACY IN
ALASKA
A. The Need for New Legislation
American philosopher John Stuart Mill argued that punish-
ment is justified only when it is designed to prevent harm to
othersY Thus, the pertinent issue is whether society is so harmed
by computer hackers, who often are talented teenage pranksters,
that it should impose criminal liability upon them as though they
were common thieves. This question must be answered in the
affirmative. While stolen goods often are replaceable, stolen
privacy is not. Unlike material goods, privacy is not insurable, and
once personal information is made public, courts cannot order the
95. Bloustein, supra note 17, at 999.
96. Kreimer, supra note 15, at 110; see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL.
L. REV. 383, 419 (1960).
97. Nelson, supra note 24, at 319.
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publicizers to forget or retrieve the information they have acquired
improperly.
Providing criminal sanctions for misuse of computerized
information is a relatively new idea. According to one commenta-
tor: "Penal law has always protected property and, in some
instances, has also recognized the need to protect secret informa-
tion .... The integration of the two, however, and the protection
of confidential information as a type of property is a relatively new
idea in the criminal realm.""8 States have resisted the imposition
of criminal law on computer misuse in part because they see such
sanctions as too severe for the type of computer-related misconduct
society seeks to control. In light of the deeply-rooted public policy
in Alaska favoring individual privacy, however, criminal penalties
for computer intruders are justified.
Over seventy-seven percent of computer users polled by the
American Bar Association support adoption of state computer
crime statutes.99 Although it has been argued that only the
common law can provide the necessary flexibility to deal with
rapidly changing technology,"° a carefully designed statute could
provide the requisite flexibility, as well as extensive enforcement
mechanisms.01 This type of legislation could be further supple-
mented by a civil tort of unauthorized dissemination of computer-
ized information. Such a comprehensive privacy protection scheme
would provide misdemeanor sanctions when a felony would be
unfairly harsh"° and civil remedies when the victim should be
compensated for financial losses.
B. The Proposed Legislation
1. Definitions and Scope. The statute proposed by this note
begins with detailed definitions of important terms.'03  Such
definitions are necessary because they ensure that all culpable
conduct is covered," allow gradations in punishment and clarify
98. Eli Lederman, Criminal Liability for Breach of Confidential Commercial
Information, 38 EMORY L.J. 921, 929 (1989).
99. A.B.A. Task Force on Computer Crime, supra note 9, at 26.
100. Graham, supra note 5, at 1426.
101. Note, supra note 18, at 1915.
102. Cf Marion, supra note 75, at 633 (in cases when interference with
computer systems does no more than inconvenience legitimate users, criminal
penalties may not be appropriate).
103. See infra Appendix § A.
104. For example, since the federal wire fraud statue covers only transmissions
made on interstate wires, it does not reach interceptions of computer resources or
data via microwaves or other electronic devices. Diana Smith, Note, Who is
Calling Your Computer Next? Hacker!, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 89, 99 (1985). The
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technical computer language that may be unclear to the layman.
The statute also has a jurisdictional hook similar to that in the
California statute.1 5 This would allow Alaska to prosecute
computer operators in other jurisdictions who commit crimes
against computer resources in Alaska. Additionally, the proposed
legislation has a provision for injunctions10 6 similar to that found
in Nevada's statute.'" Such an early intervention technique
provides greater protection against the danger the lightning speed
of computerized crime poses to privacy rights.
2. Criminal Provisions. The proposed statute recognizes four
types of computer crime: fraud, intrusion, criminal use and vandal-
ism."0 8 Computer fraud reaches activities that utilize computers
to cause financial losses or gains, including such activities as
illegally transferring money, altering credit records and deliberately
destroying computer programs.0 9 Intrusion occurs when a user
intentionally gains access to and makes use of any information
stored on computer systems without the system operator's permis-
sion, or makes use of personal information stored on computer
systems without the subject's permission.1" Such dual protection
guards against threats to business and individual privacy. The
statute protects individual privacy in another unique way:
computer intrusion also occurs if a system operator knowingly fails
to provide a reasonable level of security for systems storing
personal information."' Such provisions can help to assure
Alaskans that their privacy will be protected by organizations even
after personal information has been surrendered to the
organizations' computers.
Criminal use of a computer includes intentional, unauthorized
use of computer time and unauthorized facilitation of access.
12
Vandalism covers disruption of computer services and the introduc-
tion of viruses.' Fraud and intrusion are felonies, while criminal
proposed Alaska statute has a catch-all clause in the definition of "access" that
reaches unspecified means of "otherwise gain[ing] entry to the resources" of
computers. See infra Appendix § A(1).
105. See infra Appendix § D.
106. See infra Appendix § E.
107. See supra text accompanying note 92.
108. See infra Appendix § B; cf. Tunick, supra note 4, at 326-28 (recognizing
financial crime, information crime, theft of services and vandalism as common
computer crimes).
109. See infra Appendix § B(a)(1).
110. See infra Appendix § B(b)(1).
111. See infra Appendix § B(b)(2).
112. See infra Appendix § B(c)(1).
113. See infra Appendix § B(d)(1).
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use and vandalism are misdemeanors." 4  Thus, the proposed
statute reserves higher penalties for those who actually make use
of the information stored on computers. The proposed statute also
contains a computer equipment forfeiture provision,"5 impeding
those who have misused their computer skills from returning to
their improper activities.
Unlike other existing statutes, the proposed legislation makes
insiders as well as outsiders liable for computer crime. It focuses
not on the authorization for access but instead on the authorization
for activities engaged in after such access." 6 Thus, the statute
covers wrongdoers regardless of whether their access is authorized.
Further, the proposed law protects whistleblowers with an excep-
tion for unauthorized users who appropriate computer data in
order to report corporate crimes to the authorities."
The statute covers both misusers of information stored on
computers and mere "snoopers." Computer fraud and intrusion
focus on those who misuse information."' Accordingly, these
crimes define improper conduct with terms such as "alter," "dam-
age," "take," "copy" or "make use." The statute does not contain
the deficiency, common to statutes modeled after theft statutes, of
requiring the actor to obtain possession of the information before
a crime can occur. Criminal use and vandalism require improper
use, not improper change in locale, of computerized information
and resources." 9 Thus, the actus reus of these crimes are activi-
ties such as facilitation of access and disruption of services. Finally,
the mens rea of all of the crimes is intent. The statute does not use
114. Compare infra Appendix §§ B(a)(2) & (b)(3) with Appendix §§ B(c)(2) &
(d)(2).
115. See Infra Appendix § B(e).
116. See, e.g., infra Appendix § B(a)(1)(A) ("without permission" modifies
alters, not accesses); Appendix § B (b)(1)(A) ("without permission" modifies
takes, not accesses); Appendix § B (c)(1)(A) ("without permission" modifies uses).
117. See infra Appendix § B(f). Publicly employed whistleblowers are protected
from termination of employment by statute, ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.100 (Supp.
1993), and privately employed whistleblowers are protected by common law. See
Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 1986). The
current law does not provide any protection from criminal prosecution, however.
In the recent Alyeska Pipeline Service Company scandal, employee Bob Scott
leaked information on environmental violations to oil industry critic Charles
Hamel, who then passed the information on to Congress. Kim Fararo, Alyeska
Hearing Ends; Ruling Six Months Away, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 5,1992,
at B1. Only the deficiencies in the current law prevent Scott's prosecution; there
is no statutory exemption for unauthorized access to computers for the purpose of
reporting wrongdoings.
118. See infra Appendix §§ B(a) & (b).
119. See infra Appendix §§ B(c) & (d).
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the less appropriate mental state of knowledge, which, because of
the unique nature of computers, would include operators who
access restricted computer resources without any desire to do so or
to cause harm.
3. Civil Provisions. In addition to providing a cause of
action for the misconduct of system operators and individuals, the
civil provision of the proposed statute imposes a duty of reasonable
care on the system manager. 20 "Reasonable care" is defined as
including standard industry security measures (such as purging old
files and data), maintaining adequate security systems, and
restricting uses of collected personal information."' The imposi-
tion of a standard of care on computer system managers is unique
to the proposed legislation. The provision is designed specifically
to impress upon the collectors and users of personal information
the importance of guarding personal privacy. Such a standard of
care makes the proposed Alaskan statute stricter than any existing
statute.
In order for the Alaska legislature to combat computer abuses
effectively, however, the civil statute must be accompanied by a
criminal statute. Although tort law is useful when a hacker misap-
propriates computerized data of clear financial value, there usually
is little measurable pecuniary loss on which to predicate damages
in situations where personal information is misappropriated."
Furthermore, the typical hacker often is a student who has little
money with which to pay a civil judgment; a civil remedy alone
would not provide a sufficient deterrent to his dangerous con-
duct."2 Only a comprehensive legislative initiative that includes
penal sanctions would ensure protection for the property and the
privacy of an individual in an information society.
120. See infra Appendix § C(2). Such a provision addresses the difficulties
arising with teenage hackers, who might not have the resources to compensate
victims. See Massingale & Borthick, supra note 9, at 174.
121. See infra Appendix § A(8).
122. Compare Graham, supra note 5, at 1431-32 ("[Cjourts commonly allow the
granting of general damages in dignitary tort cases.., even though no physical or
economic harm is shown.") with Massingale & Borthick, supra note 9, at 181
(courts deny damages for purely economic loss in negligence claims).
123. Marion, supra note 75, at 634. See also Roach6, supra note 47, at 392
("One of the major purposes of penal legislation is to prevent crime. Penal
legislation informs a potential violator that the act he is contemplating is illegal
and punishable.").
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V. CONCLUSION
Almost anything of value, from financial accounts to personal
information, is reflected in some record on a computer. Leaving
Alaska's computers unprotected is like leaving the bank vault
unlocked. The state's current laws are not sufficient to protect
against the unique threat computer technology presents to privacy
concerns. The legislature should respond to this threat by passing
a bill aimed specifically at the dangers of computer crime. Both
the federal computer privacy statutes and the California computer
crime statute provide good models for Alaskan legislation, but no
statute provides the standard of care for system operators that is
necessary to prevent insiders from misusing their ability to access
broad computer resources and information. Alaska, in keeping
with its tradition as reflected in other contexts, should meet the
challenge of providing its citizens with the most stringent privacy
protection practical.
Carol R. Williams
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Section A. Definitions.
In this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise,
(1) "access" means to instruct, communicate with, store data
in, retrieve data from, or otherwise gain entry to the resources of
a computer, computer system, computer network, or any part of a
computer system or network;
(2) "computer" means an electronic device that performs
logical, arithmetic, and memory functions by the manipulation of
electronic, optical, or magnetic impulses, and includes all input,
output, processing, storage, computer software, and communica-
tions facilities that are connected or related to a computer;
(3) "computer network" means an interconnection, including
by microwave or other means of electronic or optical communica-
tion, of two or more computer systems, or between computers and
remote terminals;
(4) "computer program" means an ordered set of instructions
or statements, and related information that, when automatically
executed in actual or modified form in a computer system, causes
it to perform specified functions;
(5) "computer system" means a set of related computer
equipment, devices and software;
(6) "computer services" includes, but is not limited to,
computer time, data processing, or storage functions, or other uses
of a computer, computer system, or computer network;
(7) "data" includes a representation of information, knowledge,
facts, concepts, or instructions, that is being prepared or has been
prepared in a formalized manner and is used or intended for use in
a computer, computer system, or computer network. Data may be
in storage media, stored in the memory of a computer or in transit
or presented on a display device;
(8) "reasonable level of protection of privacy of personal
information" means computer security measures generally in use in
the relevant industry, and includes, but is not limited to, security
devices such as passwords, deleting expired accounts, and using
personal information only in the manner authorized by the subject
of such information;
(9) "without permission" means without the permission of the
owner or operator of any data, computer, computer system, or
computer network, unless otherwise indicated;
(10) "computer contaminant" means any set of computer
instructions that are designed to modify, damage, destroy, record
or transmit information within a computer, computer system, or
computer network, without the intent or permission of the owner
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of the information. It includes, but is not limited to, a group of
computer instructions commonly called viruses or worms, which are
self-replicating or self-propagating and are designed to contaminate
other computer programs or computer data, consume computer
resources, modify, destroy, record, or transmit data, or in some
fashion usurp the normal operation of the computer, computer
system, or computer network.
Section B. Computer Crimes.
Subsection (a). Computer Fraud.
(1) A person commits computer fraud if he commits any of the
following acts:
(A) intentionally accesses and without permission alters,
damages, deletes or destroys, or otherwise uses any data, computer,
computer system, or computer network in order to either (i) devise
or execute any scheme or artifice to defraud, deceive, or extort, or
(ii) wrongfully control or obtain money, property or data; or
(B) intentionally accesses and without permission adds,
alters, damages, deletes, or destroys any credit record of an
individual or institution, or any computer software, or computer
programs, which reside or exist internal or external to a computer,
computer system, or computer network;
(2) Criminal computer fraud is a class C felony.
Subsection (b). Computer Intrusion.
(1) A person commits computer intrusion if he commits any of
the following acts:
(A) intentionally accesses and without permission takes,
copies, or makes use of any data from a computer, computer
system, or computer network, or takes or copies any supporting
documentation, whether existing or residing internal or external to
a computer, computer system, or computer network; or
(B) intentionally accesses and without the person's permis-
sion takes, copies, or makes use of any information concerning a
person from a computer, computer system, computer network, or
takes or copies any supporting documentation, whether existing or
residing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or
computer network;
(2) the owner or operator of a computer, computer system, or
computer network commits computer intrusion if he knowingly fails
to provide a reasonable level of protection of privacy of personal
information;
(3) Criminal computer intrusion is a class C felony.
Subsection (c). Criminal Use of a Computer.
(1) A person commits criminal use of a computer if he
commits any of the following acts:
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(A) intentionally and without permission uses or causes to
be used computer services; or
(B) intentionally and without permission provides or assists
in providing a means of accessing a computer, computer system or
computer network;
(2) Criminal use of a computer is class A misdemeanor.
Subsection (d). Computer Vandalism.
(1) A person commits criminal computer vandalism if he
commits any of the following acts:
(A) intentionally and without permission disrupts or causes
the disruption of computer services or denies or causes the denial
of computer services to an authorized user of a computer, computer
system, or computer network; or
(B) intentionally introduces any computer contaminant into
any computer, computer system, or computer network;
(2) Criminal computer vandalism is a class A misdemeanor.
Subsection (e). Forfeiture.
Any computer, computer system, computer network, or any
software or data, owned by the defendant, which is used during the
commission of any offense described in this section shall be subject
to forfeiture.
Subsection (f). Protection for Whistleblowers.
Subsections (b) and (c) do not apply to any person to the
extent that he accesses his employer's computer system, computer
network, computer program, or data for the purpose of reporting,
exposing, or investigating illegal activities.
Section C. Civil Remedies.
In addition to any other civil remedy available,
(1) the owner or lessee of the computer, computer system,
computer network, computer program, or data may bring a civil
action against any person convicted under this section for compen-
satory damages, including any expenditure reasonably related and
necessarily incurred by the owner or lessee to verify that a
computer system, computer network, computer program, or data
was or was not altered, damaged or deleted by the access;
(2) the provider or subject of personal information which
resides or exists internal or external to a computer, computer
system, or computer network may bring a civil action against any
person convicted under this section, or against any computer,
computer system, or computer network owner or operator who fails
in his duty to provide a reasonable level of protection of the
privacy of personal information.
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Section D. Jurisdiction.
For purposes of bringing a civil or criminal action under this
section, a person who causes, by any means, the access of a
computer, computer system, or computer network in one jurisdic-
tion from another jurisdiction is deemed to have personally
accessed the computer, computer system, or computer network in
each jurisdiction.
Section E. Injunction.
If it appears that a person has engaged in or is about to engage
in any conduct which violates section B of this statute, the attorney
general or appropriate district attorney may file an injunction in
any court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the continuation of
that conduct. The injunction may be issued without proof of actual
damage sustained by any person, and such issuance does not
preclude the criminal prosecution and punishment of a violator.
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